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## **PHILOSOPHY AS A UNITY OF SCIENTIFIC AND NON-SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE**

***Abstract:** In this article, the author analyzes philosophy as a form of scientific knowledge or knowledge outside of scientific knowledge. The author explains the role of philosophy in scientific knowledge.*

***Key words:** worldview, understanding, scientific knowledge, philosophy, scientific worldview*

New time, in contrast to the medieval consciousness and way of life, proclaims science as the highest and, in essence, the only true form of knowledge. Science is interpreted not only as a standard of true knowledge, but also as knowledge of the divine. The Middle Ages considered only faith capable of knowing the absolute, of suprarational (but not anti-reasonable, according to Thomas Aquinas) knowledge. The anti-feudal philosophy of modern times puts science in the place of faith. Things are moving towards the deification of science, and this process finds its most vivid expression in Hegel, who states: “The absolute idea is the content of science.”

It would be wrong to believe that the classics of philosophy overestimated all the sciences of their time. Mathematics, undoubtedly, was highly valued by them, while the empirical sciences did not enjoy special recognition among them. “Science in the proper sense,” Kant wrote, for example, “can only be called that whose certainty is apodictic; knowledge capable of having only empirical certainty is knowledge only in an improper sense.”

Our understanding of the relationship of the classics of philosophy to science would be incomplete, insufficient if we did not fully take into account their ideas about the relationship between philosophy and the sciences. The

classics sought to turn philosophy into a science, into a rigorous science. They criticized the previous philosophy as not corresponding to the standard of scientificity. And at the same time they maintained that philosophy, inasmuch as it becomes a science, is the science of sciences, i.e. higher science, thus opposing philosophy to the sciences. It is very significant that, according to Hegel, the highest form of the absolute spirit, i.e. absolute knowledge is not science, but philosophy. In such a formulation of the question there is no underestimation of science, scientific character. We are talking about something else: philosophically meaningful, interpreted sciences are included in philosophy, which, thus, is declared the only adequate form of scientific knowledge.

So, on the one hand, already at the dawn of the New Age, science is proclaimed the standard of all knowledge, and philosophy is criticized for lack or even lack of scientific character. But, on the other hand, those philosophical systems that are declared scientific are opposed to the sciences as the highest scientific knowledge. It should also be noted that the sciences are also opposed to those philosophical teachings that do not claim to be scientific, but consider the sciences as the lowest forms of knowledge. Such, for example, are religious and philosophical teachings. Consequently, the high assessment of science, scientific character, so characteristic of the New Age, did not exclude the opposition of philosophy to the sciences. Such opposition was already present in the very understanding of philosophy as the science of sciences.

In the twentieth century, the relationship between philosophy and the sciences changes significantly. Despite the grandiose achievements of the sciences and the scientific and technological progress associated with them, a critical assessment of science arises and develops. Such an assessment also appears in the sciences themselves as an expression of their methodological crisis. However, the main role in the critical understanding of the sciences is played, of course, by philosophy. Her critical position is directly related to the

fact that, on the one hand, she is a member of the scientific community, and on the other, she is, to a greater or lesser extent, an extra-scientific phenomenon.

Here the question arises: in what sense is the concept of science applicable to philosophy? Given the highly significant differences between the sciences (for example, between mathematics and historiography), we are also entitled to ask: what is science in general? Formally, science can be defined as some institutionalized doctrine that is studied in educational institutions. Students attend lectures, participate in seminars, pass exams, and receive appropriate grades. Lectures are read by professors, associate professors conduct seminars, academic councils award academic degrees.

The institutional definition of science is essential to its existence in society. But it is completely insufficient for understanding the cognitive significance of science. It is therefore necessary to determine what distinguishes scientific knowledge from non-scientific. From my point of view, science can be defined as systematic, specialized research, limited to a certain area, research that uses concepts, proofs, special methods to achieve and test its results.

Philosophy can be considered as a science not only from an institutional, but also from a cognitive point of view. Like any science, it is a systematic, specialized study that limits its field, operating with concepts, evidence, experimental data, as well as methods for verifying its own results. Scientific is not only Spinoza's attempt to prove geometrically the foundations of his system, scientific is also Hegel's attempt, based on the concept of pure being, devoid of any definitions, to deduce a system of categories that embrace the entire reality.

Of course, we can disagree with the conclusions of Spinoza and Hegel. We can judge their systems as flawed. But these assessments, although they refer not only to the content but also to the methods of these teachings, do not refute the fact that philosophy as a form of systematic specialized research, whether or not its content is scientific, is a science (a science sui generis). It would be a gross mistake to belittle, underestimate the form of scientific

character inherent in philosophy on the grounds that it does not guarantee the scientific nature of the content. As you know, the laws of logic also do not guarantee the truth of logically correct statements, but if statements contradict logic, they are unscientific. Philosophy is consistent with logic and therefore its form is scientific, regardless of its content.

As for the content of philosophical teachings, it is extremely diverse. Some of these teachings are oriented towards analysis, comprehension, and generalization of the results of science. Such doctrines (for example, neopositivism) are scientific to a certain extent, not only in form, but also in content. Other teachings (for example, existentialism) consciously oppose the sciences and choose human experiences, subjective mental states as the subject of their research. Of course, these experiences can also be the subject of scientific research, as is the case in psychology. But existentialism, as a rule, ignores the results of psychological science. The content of existentialism is anti-scientist in nature.

Thus, if some philosophical teachings are close in their problems to the content of scientific research, then others are guided by extra-scientific content and, accordingly, to an extra-scientific approach to the study of this content. This applies not only to existentialism, but also to the “philosophy of life” in general, as well as to religious-idealistic teachings. The essential importance of non-scientific content, as well as extra-scientific approach, is beyond doubt.

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