

SOFT POWER TOOLS OF TÜRKIYE

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Abstract: The article shows the unique characteristics of Türkiye 's soft power tools in the international arena and how skillfully they use them, as well as the use of these tools shows that religion and culture are powerful weapons. From this point of view, it has shown its effectiveness in the former colonies of the Ottoman Empire and in the Muslim world. The foreignness of these concepts to the Western world and the strength of Western culture (mass culture) significantly reduces the influence of Turkish soft power tools.

Key words: "Soft Power", Türkiye, TİKA, Yunus Emro Institute, Religious Diplomacy, Mosque Diplomacy, Diyanet, Istanbul Convention.

Introduction

Joseph Nye pioneered the theory of “soft power”. In his opinion, the influence on other states through soft means of power implies the power of attraction, which allows them to achieve their place in the international arena. The role of Türkiye in entering the ranks of the countries that have their place in the international arena is great for its cultural diplomacy, which it still carries. Taking into account the language, religion and many aspects of intimacy, it will not be beneficial for Uzbekistan to apply the necessary aspects to ourselves from its achievements. He noted that Uzbekistan views Türkiye as an important and long-term partner, supports strengthening the ties of friendship between Turkish and Uzbek people, developing cooperation on the principles of mutual trust [1,288]. After all, its chosen path, is further increasing its importance in the development of interaction with states in a modern era.

Results and Discussion

Historically, it is known that in the last century Türkiye was a state with the power of coercion. However, changes from the 90s in the international arena and the state's internal activism caused the Republic to develop new perspectives on its policies [6,40-43]. Interest in the use of “soft power” in Türkiye's foreign policy arose at the beginning of our century. Turkish Explorer B.Chevik cites the mid-

2000s as a point of rise to the level of concept in political debate on a broad scale. This is directly related to the new foreign policy vision of the Justice and Development Party. The focus on the Balkan states and the Middle East, which were part of the Ottoman Empire, is growing in the past captivity. There are important factors that influence Türkiye's use of "soft power" - this was primarily to shape Türkiye's international image as a modern, secular, Western-connected state, serving as a module for the Middle Eastern states, and to join the European Union. This is reflected in Ahmet Davutoğlu's "Strategic depth: Türkiye's international position" as an important factor. It promotes the need to use "soft power" as a means of redefining the state in its place. It is the Caucasus, the Balkan States and the Middle East that are revered as important regions of special interest.

It is worth noting that Türkiye's good economic potential is a region that proved the effectiveness of "soft power" to African countries in the first decade of our century, and expressed its interest in them through its development program. In recent years, the failed coup and the fight against Fethullah Gülen's Hizmet organization have negatively affected Türkiye's position in Europe. Researcher Ahmed Erdi Öztürk tried to show the period of development of Türkiye's use of "soft power". He classified three main periods of development.

1. 2002-2010. The years of consistent development of Türkiye's "soft power". This is directly related to the Justice and Development Party. In order to implement Davutoğlu's concept, the foreign policy aimed at the European Union, and the domestic policy, the harmonious integration of Islam and democracy, and the growth of the Turkish economy on the basis of this, as well as Yunus Emri's Institute - Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, which is the main tools of "soft power", carried out considerable active work. Another unique aspect is that this period was also the period when the Hizmet movement grew.

2. 2010-2016. This period can be said to be the period of processes that influenced the significant decline of Türkiye's "soft power" policy. The centralization of power and abandonment of democratic values in domestic politics, the emergence of economic problems, the raising of the Kurdish issue, the emergence of obstacles in the implementation of foreign policy goals, and the process of Islamization of politics were also observed. In addition, it was observed that the beginning of the struggle with Ankara's one-time allies in the establishment of "Soft Power" - Hizmet organization became more active in both domestic and foreign policy .

3. From 2016 to the current one. To conduct bilateral activism in the use of "soft power" after the military coup. It was directly involved in both domestic and foreign policy with the withdrawal from democracy, the collapse of coldness

between his relations with the West, and the dramatic increase in influence of nationalist and pro-Islamist forces [2,118].

We can still see that in these periods we have developed institutional resources. Türkiye is seen as a state with relatively large capabilities. However, one can see inequality if someone analyzes its resources.

Culture is the unique wealth of Türkiye. It is in this aspect that it has an advantage in “soft power”[3,50-71]. It has a very large cultural material and intangible heritage. A vivid proof of this is that there are many masterpieces of Türkiye in UNESCO's list of cultural heritage. The dramatic growth of Turkish cinematography as part of popular culture further increased interest worldwide. Interestingly, on the basis of the development of Tourism, the achievement of TV shows is considered one of its driving powers. Turkish TV series are currently sold to more than a hundred countries, from Europe to Africa. The number of viewers who watched them with great interest, on the other hand, exceeded one hundred million. This is on the example of a single Turkish TV, in addition, at the moment there is an increasing interest in Turkish products, dress styles, appearance, behavior, Turkish linguistics.

The spread of these around the world makes the “soft power” work effectively, raising Türkiye's external image. In Europe, we can see that Turkish culture is widely recognized and awarded international importance to Turkish cinema and directors. A notable example of this was the 2006 award of the Nobel Prize in literature to Orhan Pamuk, which caused much hype. At this point, it should be noted that the importance of the Turkish language is great. Turkish belongs to the Turkic language family and predominates mainly in terms of the number of speakers on the Asian continent.

It also forms a large diaspora in the European continent. Of particular importance to this are the Balkan states, which were once in the Ottoman Empire. Dovutoglu stressed in particular that it was in his concept that this region plays an important role in defining the position in Europe. The Justice and Development Party era also saw several significant changes in education. In particular, the number of universities was 76 in 2002, compared to 206 by 2018. Turkish universities are ranked among the best universities in the world.

International cooperation on education is growing-cooperation relations are being established with universities of countries of particular interest. Many grant programs are announced annually to attract students from around the world. A vivid example of this is the International University in Sarajevo and the International Balkan University in Skopje. Türkiye, compiled from the interplay of Islam and modernity, manifests itself as a source of “soft power”.

It is in this aspect that it is considered a model for the Muslim world. In a secular state, which proves the existence of Muslim democracy, market economy, a relatively stable democratic regime, the Islamic community has branched out. According to the opinion of Tuba Chovush, a survey of the famous TESEV mental center of Türkiye in the region shows that the attraction of Türkiye is very high. That is, more than 60% of Arab states saw the Turkish model as a bright example for themselves. It follows that increasing the influence of Islam in the Christian world Islamization of social, political life is slowly gaining momentum. At the same time, Türkiye is masterfully using "religion diplomacy", "mosque diplomacy", taking advantage of the fact that it is a progressive state in the Muslim world. It can be said that this is a kind of element of "soft power".

Türkiye is implementing a program to build mosques for the Muslim world around the world. However, events in recent years have negatively affected Türkiye's external image. Also, the strengthening of authoritarian elements and the persecution of the Gülen movement increased the fear of Türkiye. In general, in recent times, Türkiye has been stuck in a whirlwind of several problems. The Islamization of Turkish politics, an overtly anti-Western shift, the use of the Turkish diaspora in Europe in the way of its goals has exaggerated fear of it in the Western world. The Balkan states in particular began to oppose the emergence of a force that would compete with other European states. Even so, European settlement remains as an important factor in the use of "soft power".

One of the forces driving the "soft power" is the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency. Its origins go back to the 90s. At that time, the rapprochement with the post-Soviet republics, which spoke Turkic languages, was advanced. It was tasked with helping Turkic-speaking countries, developing social, economic, cultural and mutually beneficial trade relations. In the early days of his activism, it focused mainly on the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus. After 2002, the agency expanded its scope of activity.

The agency increased influence in areas that were former Ottoman colonies. It began to support projects approved in Europe and the Middle East, which are in line with Türkiye's foreign policy in these areas [9,135-152] its impact now covered the implementation of projects related to development program, infrastructure, tourism, education. In Europe, especially in the Balkan states, Kosovo, Herzegovina, Bosnia, the agency is working much more actively [10,63].

The most important aspect is that the aspect that remains an integral part of its activism lies in the restoration of the Ottoman cultural heritage on the basis of mutual assistance in this area. Because many endangered cultural sites are fertile here. The restoration of the former culture is considered beneficial to Türkiye in every possible way. On the one hand, to increase its importance through the restoration of Turkish culture in the region, while on the other hand, the

development of tourism lies [11,212]. The attention of a wide range of assistance programs was also attracted by Moldova. The area is inhabited by the Turkic-speaking Gagauz. In a notable aspect, the agency actively participated in the restoration of the Presidential Palace in Moldova, which was damaged by mass protests in 2009 [10,63].

Founded in 2007, the Yunus Emro Institute can be said to be the driving force behind Türkiye's cultural diplomacy and in turn a means of exercising "soft power". It is engaged in cooperation with cultural initiatives abroad and support, development of history, language, culture, art, scientific research in this area.

There is another important tool that is worth mentioning. It is a Diyanet (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı). Its activism is largely dependent on religion and is concerned with the free belief of Muslim representatives abroad and the preservation, preservation of Islamic values. That is:

- * Restore steps that are important to the Muslim world, investing in it.
- * Sending imams from Türkiye for mosques.
- Persecute support of religious education.
- Oppose the humiliation of Muslims.
- Fight against Gulen followers.
- * Establish relations with Islamic organizations abroad.

The contribution of the Turkish imams in promoting their views of the Diyanet organization in foreign countries is significant. It was for this reason that French President Macron banned Turkish imams from actively practicing on France. And in Germany and Austria, a number of Turkish imams are accused of espionage.

In a slightly different way from the "soft power" tools mentioned above, we can also include the Istanbul Convention in this order. Because 13 countries have had time to sign this convention to date. Its essence is that:

- combat any aggression against women.
- protect women's rights.
- help victims of aggression in different ways (physiological, psychological).
- * establish educational programs in the same area with non-governmental organizations.

This convention aims to prevent the humiliation and oppression of women in Türkiye over the years, but also in many Muslim states. It is noteworthy that the convention was adopted during the Prime Ministry of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and he himself approved it as an anti-aggression convention [13]

Conclusion

It is covered in this article that the institutes driving the “soft power” policy mentioned above are an important factor in strengthening Türkiye's influence. It is these tools that testify to the fact that, through a very clearly developed system, they have achieved great achievements in their activity in many regions. At the same time it is worth noting that in geographically close Europe, the “soft power” faced a number of obstacles in the implementation of its policy. The real reasons for this are that there has been a change in both external and internal politics. But for the implementation of “soft power”, a favorable ground has been created in Türkiye. While these include the presence of roots of cultural values in areas that were once a Turkish colony, on the one hand one can cite areas that are linguistically close to each other. In this context, the Islamic factor is of particular importance. With the help of cultural support programs through the above-mentioned tools in increasing their influence, great achievements have been achieved in Central Asia, Arab states, the Middle East, the Balkan states, the African region. In recent years, it has seen a state of reduced impact. A number of internal reasons can be said for this. These include Ankara's inconsistency in the implementation of the “soft power” policy, Diyonat, Istanbul Convention. In this context, it is permissible to cite the views of Amad Erdi Öztürk: “Türkiye is a mixed example of soft power”. That is, it classifies it by the fact that it cannot effectively use resources at hand in this area [12,125]. It now faces east away from the Western world. This can be explained by the inability to join the European Union, the weakening of its influence in Europe, increased fear of Türkiye. In doing so, the strength of the influence of Christendom in the West and the unwillingness to bring about the power opposed to it in this region is encouraging the east to strengthen cooperation with Islamic states.

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